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1 Introduction
An excessive cyclicality of bank lending can create a number of potential problems such
as exacerbating the business cycle, increasing systemic risk and misallocating lending
resources (Berger and Udell, 2004). As a result, all factors which amplify the cyclicality
of bank lending may represent risks to both the macroeconomy and nancial stability.
Several theories of bank behavior, such as disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1986),
herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) or the institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell,
2004), highlight the role of banks in the pro-cyclical variations in loan market conditions.
Empirical investigations (Asea and Blomberg, 1998; Lown and Morgan, 2006) also show
that changes in lending standards imposed by banks increase the cyclicality of bank
lending and then amplify the business cycle. Some authors also show that the capital
adequacy constraint may lead banks behavior to amplify the credit cycle (Bikker, 2004,
Zicchino, 2005)1.
However, the literature mentioned above provides only a partial explanation of the
stylized facts about cyclicality because it disregards banksprovisioning practices and
their links with the cyclicality of bank lending. In this paper, we focus on provision-
ing rules and their e¤ects on the loan market. In most countries, loan loss provisions
are made up of general provisions and specic provisions. General provisions refer to
probabilistic losses that cannot be supported by loan specic documentation. There are
therefore highly judgmental and are in many countries subject of regulatory restrictions.
Specic provisions refer instead to certain events (such as due payments or other default-
like events) for which a specic documentation can be produced and they are tied by
1Capital requirements is said to be procyclical because during a downturn capital becomes more
expensive and banks often respond by cutting bank lending or shifting towards lower-risk customers. By
contrast, in the boom phase, banks can obtain additional capital under more favorable terms, which may
give further impetus to their lending.
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accounting rules to identied problem loans. Such provisioning systems are therefore
said to be backward-looking. Specic provisions are mainly linked to problem loans and
are therefore counter-cyclical2. Stylized facts show that total loan loss provisions are
negatively a¤ected by the output growth rate (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Laeven and
Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) and that the ratio of loan loss provisions
to total loans is highly counter-cyclical (Clerc et al., 2001; Arpa et al., 2001; Fernan-
dez de Lis et al., 2001; Pain, 2003). This suggests that specic provisions are the main
determinant of changes in total loan loss provisions3.
We consider that such a backward-looking provisioning system represents an unsat-
isfactory institutional arrangement over a business cycle because expected loan losses
are inadequately taken into account, being mainly covered with specic provisions when
loans turn bad. On the contrary, banks should rather cover their expected loan losses
progressively as soon as loans are granted. The gap between loan loss provisions and
expected loan losses could a¤ect loan market uctuations, given that loan loss provisions
directly a¤ect the cost of bank lending. If banks do not build up loan loss provisions
during economic upswings, the cost of loans is understated. Banks have then incentives
to ease lending standards. By contrast, during a downturn, the cost of loans is under-
stated if banks had not accumulated loan loss reserves over prior periods to deal with
contemporaneous problem loans. Banks can therefore tighten conditions on the loan
market.
A forward-looking provisioning system, also called a dynamic or statistical provision-
2Indeed, specic provisions increase during an economic downturn when a signicant deterioration in
credit quality occurs, and decrease during an economic upswing when the likelihood of loan default is
low.
3Banks can also develop a discretionary income smoothing behavior (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001;
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). When earnings are expected to be low
(high), loan loss provisions are deliberately understated (overstated) to mitigate adverse e¤ects of other
factors on earnings. Such a behavior can reduce the cyclicality of loan loss provisions.
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ing system4, could provide a satisfactory institutional arrangement to cover expected loan
losses. In such a system, a new element, called the statistical provisions, is introduced
aside from specic and general provisions. These statistical provisions are dened by
accounting rules to cover expected losses. Banks have to evaluate the latent risk over
a whole business cycle of their loan portfolio. Statistical provisions are dened as the
di¤erence between the estimation of latent losses and specic provisions. During an up-
swing phase, specic provisions are generally low and banks can therefore build up a fund
of statistical provisions. Conversely, during a downturn, specic provisions increase and
can be greater than latent losses, which means that the fund of statistical provisions pre-
viously accumulated is used to cope with numerous contemporaneous problem loans. As
a result, statistical provisions o¤set the counter-cyclical evolutions of specic provisions,
and total loan loss provisions are smoothed over time5.
The cyclicality of provisioning systems has already been investigated from an empir-
ical point of view (Borio et al. 2001; Clerc et al., 2001; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005
for example), as well as the impact of such cyclicality on bank lending (Bouvatier and
Lepetit, 2008 and 2010). However, there is no theoretical model, to our knowledge, which
examines the e¤ects of loan loss provisions on the loan market. This paper is an attempt
to ll this gap in the literature. More precisely, we develop a partial equilibrium model
of a banking rm to analyze how provisioning rules inuence loan market uctuations.
We show that a backward-looking provisioning system amplies the pro-cyclicality of
loan market uctuations. We demonstrate that, in a forward-looking provisioning system
4See Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001), Mann and Michael (2002) and Jiménez and Saurina (2006) for
more details about the forward-looking provisioning system. Such a system has been implemented in
Spain since 2000.
5Therefore, statistical provisions are an alternative to discretionary loan loss provisions made for
income smoothing. Indeed, Pérez et al. (2008) show that the implementation of a dynamic provisioning
system in Spain reduced the income smoothing behavior.
4
where statistical provisions are used to smooth the evolution of total loan loss provisions,
the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan market uctuations does not exist. Our results sup-
port the recent call of the Basel Committee for the implementation of a forward-looking
provisioning system to address procyclicality (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. The optimal behavior of the bank under the di¤erent provisioning systems is
presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We develop a partial equilibrium model of a representative banking rm. We assume that
the representative bank i (i = 1; :::; N) is specialized in loans of type i. Specialization can
refer to a type of borrower, sector or to a geographical area (Carletti et al., 2007). The
representative bank i supply therefore only loans of type i and operates in a monopolistic
competition market. We also assume that the bank i faces an exogenous business cycle.
Our aim is to explicitly introduce bank provisioning behavior. Three provisioning sys-
tems are considered. Firstly, we consider a strict backward-looking provisioning system
in which loan loss provisions are triggered by past due payments. In such a system, the
bank evaluates its credit risk exposure over the short run (i.e. on current non performing
loans) and then sets loan rates depending on economic conditions. Secondly, we examine
a forward-looking provisioning system in which loan loss provisions consist of two com-
ponents: one related to past due payments and another one related to expected losses in
order to o¤set the counter-cyclical behavior of the rst component. In this case, credit
risk exposure is assessed over a whole business cycle. This implies that the determination
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of loan rates is less a¤ected by economic conditions. Finally, we consider the capital
bu¤er system where the representative bank applies backward-looking provisioning rules
and uses a capital bu¤er in order to cover expected losses which are not covered by loan
loss provisions. The model allows comparison of the banks behavior on the loan market
in these three provisioning systems6. As the loan rate depends on the provisioning rules,
the Modigliani-Miller theorem breaks down and then the choice of accounting methods
matters for real decisions.
2.1 Activities of the bank and prot function
The representative bank i performs an intermediation activity7. We assume that banks
supply long-term loans with a exible interest rate8. Its asset side is made up of loans
(Li;t) and a safe assets (Si;t). As the loan portfolio contains expected loan losses, loan
loss reserves (LLRi;t) are deducted from assets. Loans minus loan loss reserves are called
net loans (Walter, 1991). The liability side is made up of debts9 (Di;t) and equity (Ki;t).
The bank balance sheet identity is
Li;t   LLRi;t + Si;t = Di;t +Ki;t: (1)
6We do not include general provisions in our model, as they do not matter to modelize the counter-
cyclicality of loan loss provisions (Clerc et al., 2001; Arpa et al., 2001; Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001;
Pain, 2003).
7The model is written at time t.
8We assume a exible interest rate on loans for computational simplicity.
9As in Van den Heuvel (2002), banks liabilities include deposits as well as market debt. Moreover, we
assume that all debt liabilities are covered by deposit insurance and that the deposit insurance premium
is equal to zero. Therefore, the banksdebt-funding costs do not depend on the debt equity ratio and
probability of bankruptcy. The explicit introduction of a positive deposit insurance premium would not
alter any result relative to the bank provisioning behavior.
6
We assume that equity and loan loss reserves are invested in safe assets such as government
bonds10, so that
Si;t = LLRi;t +Ki;t: (2)
The safe asset is supposed to be a short term investment of one period. This assumption
assures that equity and loan loss reserves are liquid and available to face losses.
The prot of bank i (i;t) comes from its intermediation activity
i;t = r
L
i;tLi;t(1  J(yt) G(yt)) + rMt Si;t   rMt Di;t   LLPi;t   Li;tG(yt); (3)
where rLi;t is the interest rate on loans, r
M
t is the risk-free interest rate applied to debts and
safe assets, yt is output, functions J(yt) and G(yt) represent respectively the fraction of
non performing loans (i.e. problem loans) and the fraction of charged-o¤ loans11, LLPi;t
represents loan loss provisions and Li;tG(yt) represents unanticipated charge-o¤s (i.e.
charge-o¤s for which the bank did not set aside loan loss reserves)12. The fractions of
10Not all government bonds can be considered as safe assets, particularly with the sovereign debt
crisis undergone by some countries. But we consider that bonds underwriten by some countries such as
Germany and the United-States can be considered as safer. However, the German euro denominated
bonds can no longer be regarded as totally riskless given their exposure to the sovereign debt crisis of
some European countries. The US dollar denominated bonds of the United-States are also not totally
riskless due to the credit risk of the municipalities and the importance of national debt which exceeds
80% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009). Further, non-ination indexed bonds face ination risks, and
countries whose exchange rates are not pegged to the euro or the USD will also face exchange rate risks
if they hold reserves in German or US bonds.
11Charged-o¤ loans occur when debts are uncollectible and are removed from the balance sheet.
12The loan portfolio is made up of three loan categories during period t: (i) good loans, (ii) problem
loans and (iii) charged-o¤ loans. As we will see during the calibration of the model based mainly on
the database Bankscope Fitch IBCA, most loans are good loans. Loans judged likely to produce a
loss are classied as problem loans. Recognized losses are classied as charged-o¤ loans. Most of these
charged-o¤ loans were classied as problem loans over prior periods. But some loans can directly move
from category (i) to category (iii). If the bank did not make loan loss reserves on them, they are called
unanticipated charge-o¤s. We assume for simplicity that  is constant. We could consider that this
parameter is a¤ected by a shock when numerous or few loans are directly move from category (i) to
category (iii) but this point is out of the scope of the paper.
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non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans are dened by
J(yt) = j0(yt=y)
 !zt; (4)
G(yt) = g0(yt=y)
 vt; (5)
where j0 and g0 are respectively the steady state fraction (or average fraction over a whole
business cycle) of non performing loans and of charged-o¤loans per period, yt=y represents
the output gap (y is therefore the steady state output and yt the current output),  > 0
and ! > 0 are the elasticities with respect to the output gap, and zt and vt represent
shocks with mean one and standard deviation z and v13. The output gap a¤ects the
nancial situation of rms and households and therefore negatively a¤ects the fraction of
non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans. The shocks zt and vt underline that non
performing loans and charged-o¤ loans are not fully predictable even if the output gap is
known. In addition, we do not assume that non performing loans and charged-o¤ loans
depend on the interest rate charged by the bank. The model does not focus on problems
of moral hazard or adverse selection in the loan market14.
Equation (3) states that the bank prot comes from the interest rate on loans. How-
ever, interest earnings accrued but not received on problem loans and on charged-o¤ loans
during the period are subtracted from earnings. The bank receives therefore interest only
on the proportion (1 J(yt) G(yt)) of its loan portfolio: The fraction (1  ) of charged-
o¤ loans had been provisioned over prior periods and does not a¤ect current earnings,
whereas unanticipated charged-o¤ loans (Li;tG(yt)) are subtracted from earnings since
13These shocks will be specied during the calibration of the model.
14We can also note than we do not assume that charged-o¤ loans depend explicitly on last periods
nonperforming loans because some loans can directly move from the good loans category to the charged-
o¤ loans category and also because the fraction of nonperforming loans which move into the charged-o¤
loans category is not necessarily the same for each period.
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they represent recognized losses which had not been anticipated. The bank has to pay
for debts (rMt Di;t). In addition, loan loss provisions (LLPi;t) are charged against earnings
to account for expected losses covered during the current period15. We can therefore see
from equation (3) that provisioning rules inuence the banks prot.
Prots are shared between retained earnings (Ki;t+1  Ki;t) used to modify the level
of equity and dividends paid out to shareholders (i;t)
i;t = Ki;t+1  Ki;t +i;t: (6)
Negatives dividends operate as equity issuing, and retained earnings are used to comply
with the risk-based capital requirement which can be written as
Ki;t+1 > k0Li;t+1; (7)
where k0 is the regulatory threshold (the tier 1 requirement is 4% in Basel I) and we
assume a risk weight on loans of one. We assume for simplicity that this regulatory
constraint (equation (7)) is always binding; banks hold the minimum regulatory capital
required 16. Equation (6) shows that the choice between dividends and retained earnings
is intertemporal. The level of capital at the beginning of the period Ki;t is considered
as given and the level of retained earnings chosen by the bank gives the level of capital
available for the next period (Ki;t+1). The risk-based capital requirement is therefore
written for period t+ 1.
15Our variable LLPi;t has three di¤erent specications according to the provisioning system considered
(see section 2.2).
16This simplication allows us to focus on bank provisioning behavior. However, it could also be
interesting in a further developement to examine the e¤ects of the capital requirement on the banks
lending behavior. For example, Furne (2001) considers in his model the cost of equity issuing and the
cost related to a binding capital constraint in order to specify how the bank sets its equities.
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2.2 Provisioning rules
Provisioning rules are dened by the banking regulator. These rules can be backward-
looking, i.e. based on current non performing loans, or forward-looking, i.e. specied in
order to smooth provisions made by the bank over a whole business cycle. In addition,
if the bank believes that not enough loan loss provisions have been done according to
regulatory requirements, the bank can hold a capital bu¤er.
We consider three specications of the model according to provisioning rules and
practices : a strict backward-looking provisioning system, a forward-looking provisioning
system and a capital bu¤er system17.
2.2.1 The strict backward-looking provisioning system
The rst provisioning system is a strict backward-looking provisioning system in which
the bank strictly implements the backward-looking provisioning rules. The analysis of
the banks lending behavior in such a system will allow us to highlight the role of loan loss
provisions in the pro-cyclical variation in loan market conditions. We therefore assume
that the bank uses the accounting prot in its optimizing behavior and does not try to
o¤set the weaknesses of the backward-looking accounting rules to determine the economic
prot.
In a backward-looking provisioning system, loan loss provisions are driven by non
performing loans. Loan loss reserves t therefore identied problem loans rather than
17A forward-looking provisioning system is based on the way that banks set loan loss provisions (Fer-
nandez de Lis et al. (2001), Jiménez and Saurina (2006)). We therefore focus on loan loss provisions
rather than on loan loss reserves. In addition, we do not need to specify loan loss reserves to solve the
model since they are invested in a safe asset. But by denition, variations in loan loss reserves are equal
to loan loss provisions plus unanticipated charged-o¤ loans (subtracted from earnings) minus charged-o¤
loans (Walter, 1991). This implies that loan loss provisions are equal to anticipated charged-o¤ loans at
the steady state.
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expected loan losses18. Loan loss provisions are dened as following
LLPi;t = H
B(Li;t; yt) = h0Li;tJ(yt) (8)
where Li;t reprents the loans, yt is the current output, h0 is the steady state fraction (or
average fraction over a whole business cycle) of non performing loans (Li;tJ(yt)) which
are covered by loan loss provisions during a period.
This specication ensures a counter-cyclical evolution of loan loss provisions which is
the main stylized fact in a backward-looking provisioning system (see Clerc et al., 2001;
Arpa et al., 2001; Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001 and Pain, 2003). Identied problem loans
underestimate expected loan losses during an economic expansion and the bank has to
make numerous loan loss provisions during the downturn. This system has therefore a
pro-cyclical e¤ect on bank prots.
2.2.2 The forward-looking provisioning system
In the forward-looking provisioning system, the accounting rules require that the bank
make loan loss provisions related both to past due payments and to expected losses. Total
loan loss provisions are therefore smoothed over time and loan loss reserves t expected
losses of the loan portfolio. Loan loss provisions in the forward-looking provisioning
system are dened as follow
LLPi;t = H
F(Li;t) = h0Li;tj0; (9)
18An expected loss arises from the moment a loan is granted. Consequently, a future loss can be
expected on a good loan. In addition, the bank can estimate its expected losses over a whole business
cycle and deduce a constant expected losses per period.
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where HF(Li;t) represents total loan loss provisions19. Loan loss provisions are smoothed
around the steady state expected loss per period (h0Li;tj0). The counter-cyclicality of
non performing loans related to the business cycle is not relevant anymore to determine
loan loss provisions. As a result, economic prot and accounting prot are the same in
such a system, as expected losses are perfectly taken into account by accounting rules.
2.2.3 The capital bu¤er system
In the capital bu¤er system, backward-looking provisioning rules are implemented but the
bank takes into account the weaknesses of this accounting practice and tries to evaluate
its economic prot. We assume that the bank builds a capital bu¤er (KBt) to cover the
expected losses which are not covered by loan loss reserves20. The law of motion of the
capital bu¤er is dened by
KBi;t+1 = KBi;t + (H
F(Li;t)  HB(Li;t; yt)): (10)
The amount ( HF(Li;t)  HB(Li;t; yt)) represents the di¤erence between loan loss provi-
sions in the forward-looking provisioning system and loan loss provisions in the backward-
looking provisioning system, i.e. provisions related to expected losses. A fraction  2 [0; 1]
is added to the capital bu¤er. For example, if problem loans are low ( HF(Li;t) >
HB(Li;t; yt)), expected losses over period t are understated in the backward-looking provi-
19HF(Li;t) reprents the sum of the two components of loan loss provisions, one related to past due
payments and the other one related to expected losses. The latter component is therefore equal to
h0Li;tj0(1  (yt=y) !zt): As a result, provisions in the forward-looking system do not explicitly depend
on statistical prediction of non performing loans at period t+ 1. Rules are specied in order to smooth
provisions made by the bank over a whole business cycle.
20Banks hold more prudential capital than that required by regulators, with a total capital bu¤ers
(Tier 1 plus Tier 2) on average across the EU15 of 2.93 per cent over the period 1997-2004 (Jokipii and
Milne, 2006). Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess capital (Jokipii
and Milne, 2006). One of these explanations is that capital bu¤ers can be used to cover expected future
losses. In the model we do not make the distinction between Tier 1 capital and general provisions (which
are included in Tier 2 capital). They are considered as equivalent in the capital bu¤er hold by the bank.
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sioning system and then the bank increases the capital bu¤er by ( HF(Li;t)  HB(Li;t; yt))
to obtain a better estimate of its economic prot21. The capital bu¤er is added to stan-
dard equity (Ki;t). We dene therefore total capital (TKi;t) as
TKi;t = Ki;t +KBi;t: (11)
Then, the bank balance sheet becomes
Li;t + Si;t   LLRi;t = Di;t + TKi;t: (12)
We assume that the capital bu¤er is invested in safe assets (Si;t) so that
Si;t = LLRi;t + TKi;t: (13)
The banks ow budget constraint is given by
TKi;t+1 TKi;t+i;t = rLi;tLi;t(1  J(yt) G(yt))+ rMt Si;t  rMt Di;t LLPi;t  Li;tG(yt):
(14)
2.3 Loan demand
We assumed that the representative bank i operates in a monopolistic competition mar-
ket. Banks o¤er di¤erentiated loans and then each bank faces a specic demand for its
type of loans. Based on Henzel et al. (2007) and Carletti et al. (2007), we dene this
21The parameter  is exogenous in the model. We do not specify the banks incentive to build up a
capital bu¤er. The capital bu¤er system is simply considered as an alternative to the forward-looking
provisioning system.
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specic loan demand as
Li;t =
 
rLi;t
rLt
! 
Lt; (15)
where Lt is the aggregated demand for loans, rLt is the average interest rate on loans,  is
the elasticity of Li;t with respect to the interest rate on loans and  is the bank market
share (with  = 1=N). The parameter  represents therefore an inverse measure of the
bank monopolistic power.
3 The bank maximization behavior
We assume that the bank maximizes the present discounted value of future dividends.
The banks maximization problem consists of choosing the interest on loans (rLi;t). In the
backward-looking provisioning system, the maximization problem is written as
max
rLi;t
Et
1X
j=0
t+jt+j; (16)
where
t = r
L
i;tLi;t(1  J(yt) G(yt))  rMt Di;t   LLPi;t   Li;tG(yt) +Ki;t  Ki;t+1; (17)
subject to equations (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (15), and where  is a standard
discount factor22. In the forward-looking provisioning system, equation (8) is replaced
with equation (9). In the capital bu¤er system, the bank maximization problem is the
same than in the backward-looking provisioning system except that: (i) equations (10),
(11) are added as constraints; (ii) equations (1) and (2) are replaced with equations (12)
22We assume that the discount factor is constant and does not depend on the cost of equity.
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and (13); (iii) dividends are given by equation (14).
3.1 Optimal interest rate on loans
The rst order condition (FOC) gives the optimal interest rate on loans. We obtain in
the backward-looking provisioning system (details are available upon request)
rLi;t(1  J(yt) G(yt)) =

   1

rMt + h0J(yt) + G(yt) + (k0=   k0)
	
: (18)
As the bank earns interest only on a fraction of their loans (1  J(yt) G(yt)), the left-
hand side of equation (18) represents the marginal return on loans. The right-hand side of
equation (18) shows that several factors inuence the bank when setting the loan interest
rate. More precisely, the bank applies a mark-up (=(   1)) on the marginal cost of its
lending activity.
There are four components in the marginal cost of the banks lending activity : the cost
of debt (rMt ), the provisioning cost (h0J(yt)), the unanticipated charge-o¤s cost (G(yt))
and the cost related to the capital requirement ((k0=   k0)). Anticipated recognized
losses had been provisioned over prior periods and do not a¤ect the current prot. As a
result, provisioning rules (i.e. the rules according to which losses are anticipated) matter
in the optimal decision concerning the loan interest rate. In the strict backward-looking
system, loan loss provisions depend mainly on problem loans and then the provisioning
cost is negatively a¤ected by the business cycle.
This e¤ect of provisioning rules on the loan rate is di¤erent in the forward-looking
provisioning system. The FOC is given by
rLi;t(1  J(yt) G(yt)) =

   1

rMt + h0j0 + G(yt) + (k0=   k0)
	
: (19)
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Provisions related to expected losses o¤set the counter-cyclical evolution of provisions
related to past due payments, so that loan loss provisions are no more a¤ected by the
counter-cyclical evolutions of problem loans. As a result, the marginal provisioning cost
is given by h0j0.
In the capital bu¤er system, the bank applies backward-looking provisioning rules and
creates a capital bu¤er to cover the expected loan losses which are not covered by loan
loss reserves. The optimal decision regarding the interest rate on loans is given by
rLi;t(1 J(yt) G(yt)) =

   1

rMt +h0(j0+(1 )J(yt))+G(yt)+(k0=   k0)
	
: (20)
The di¤erences between equations (19) and (20) show that the banks behavior is identical
in the capital bu¤er system and the forward-looking provisioning system only if  = 1.
Under this condition, the expected losses not covered by loan loss reserves are fully
covered by the capital bu¤er. However, a high capital bu¤er requires that the bank
uses retained earnings to increase its capitalization instead of increasing dividends during
economic upswings. Shareholders may not appreciate such a strategy and may demand
higher dividends (and then  < 1). Banks may therefore not be able to completely
o¤set the counter-cyclical evolution of loan loss provisions by building a capital bu¤er.
The forward-looking provisioning system presents the advantage to require banks to also
make provisions related to expected losses that smooth the evolution of total loan loss
provisions.
16
3.2 Business cycle and loan market
We can see with equations (18), (19) and (20) that the interest rate on loans is the same
in the three provisioning systems when considering the steady state. It is given by23
rL(1  j0   g0) = 
   1

rM + h0j0 + g0 + (k0=   k0)
	
; (21)
where rL and rM represent respectively the steady state value of the loan interest rate
and of the interest rate on debts.
However, the short term dynamics in the loan market are di¤erent for the three
provisioning systems. These dynamics can be appreciated by log-linearizing the rst
order condition on the interest rate on loans (equations (18), (19) and (20)). We also
introduce the aggregate loan demand. Based on the work of Calza et al. (2006), the
aggregate loan demand is as following 24
L^t = yy^t   rL(r^Lt   Etf^t+1g); (22)
where t is the ination rate. The aggregate loan demand increases when output in-
creases, and decreases when the real loan rate increases.
In the backward-looking provisioning system, the log-linearization of equation (18) is
given by (details are available upon request)
'0r^
L
t = '1r^
M
t + '2z^t + '3v^t   '4y^t; (23)
23We consider the symetric equilibrium to determine the steady state (rLi;t = r
L
t = r
L).
24The variable X^t denotes the percentage (logarithmic) deviations of the variable Xt from its steady
state value X.
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where '0  rL(1 j0 g0); '1  ZrM ; '2  rLj0+Zh0j0; '3  rLg0+Zg0; '4  !'2+'3
and Z  =(   1).
The loan market dynamics depend on several factors. First, deviations of the loan
rate (r^Lt ) around its steady state depend on deviations of the interest rate on debt (r^
M
t ).
Variations in nancing costs are therefore passed on to the loan rate and lead to changes
in loans (L^t) as we can see from equation (22).
Second, shocks on problem loans (z^t) and on charged-o¤ loans (v^t) positively a¤ect
the loan rate r^Lt . We have an increase in credit risk in case of positive shocks, which
leads to an increase in the loan rate and then to a decrease in loans. The e¤ect of a
charged-o¤ loans shock on r^Lt is measured by the parameter '3. This parameter is made
up of two components and suggests that an increase in the fraction of charged-o¤ loans
impacts on r^Lt because the bank faces (i) a decrease in interest earnings (r
Lg0) and (ii)
an unanticipated loss (Zg0). Similarly, the e¤ect of a non performing loans shock is
measured by the parameter '2: An increase in the fraction of non performing loans leads
to both a decrease in interest earnings (rLj0) and to an increase of provisions (Zh0j0), as
suggested by the two components of the parameter '2:
Third, the business cycle (y^t) negatively a¤ects the loan rate r^Lt . This e¤ect is mea-
sured by the parameter '4  !'2 + '3. The business cycle a¤ects the banks behavior
through its impact on the levels of non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans. An
economic downturn implies an increase in problem loans and charged-o¤ loans, leading
to an increase in the loan rate. This reinforces the direct e¤ect of the business cycle on
loans, measured by the parameter y in equation (22).
Equations (22) and (23) show therefore that the provisioning system matters in the
loan market dynamics. Provisions are driven by problem loans in a backward-looking
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provisioning system. These provisioning rules amplify the e¤ects of the business cycle
(y^t) and of a non performing loans shock (z^t) on the loan market. This amplication
e¤ect is measured by Zh0j0 in the parameter '2.
Proposition 1:
A backward-looking provisioning system amplies the e¤ect of the business cycle on
the loan market. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the impact of the business cycle
on loan loss provisions.
This magnifying e¤ect of loan loss provisions on the loan market is no more relevant
in a forward-looking provisioning system where loan loss provisions do not only depend
on problem loans. The log-linearization of the FOC on the loan interest rate (equation
(19)) is given by
'0r^
L
t = '1r^
M
t + '
0
2z^t + '3v^t   '04y^t; (24)
where '02  rLj0 and '04  !'02 + '3.
The e¤ect of a non performing loans shock is smaller in the forward-looking provi-
sioning system ('02 < '2). The e¤ect of the business cycle is also smaller ('
0
4 < '4). The
deviations of the loan rate as well as the uctuations in the loan market are therefore
less important in a forward-looking provisioning system where provisions related to past
due payments do not longer a¤ect the banks behavior since their variations are o¤set by
provisionsmade to cover expected losses.
Proposition 2:
The provisioning rules do not amplify the e¤ect of the business cycle on the loan
market in a forward-looking provisioning system.
The third provisioning system that we considered is the capital bu¤er system. The
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log-linearized FOC on the loan rate (equation (20)) is given by
'0r^
L
t = '1r^
M
t + '
00
2 z^t + '3v^t   '004 y^t; (25)
where '002  rLj0 + Z(1  )h0j0 and '004  !'002 + '3:
If  is equal to 1, the capital bu¤er and loan loss reserves are mixed to fully cover
expected losses. In this case, the behavior of the bank is the same as in the forward-
looking provisioning system ('002 = '
0
2 and '
00
4 = '
0
4) and provisioning rules do not amplify
the e¤ect of the business cycle25. However, the constraint  = 1 requires the bank to
accumulate a capital bu¤er during the economic expansion which will be used during the
downturn.
Proposition 3:
The use of a capital bu¤er to cover the expected losses o¤sets the e¤ect of the business
cycle on provisions; however, this might imply a high uctuation in the capital of the
bank.
4 Concluding remarks
Our model shows that accounting rules on loan loss provisions matter to explain loan
market uctuations. We nd that a backward-looking provisioning system amplies the
pro-cyclicality of bank lending. Such an e¤ect is removed in a forward-looking provi-
sioning system where statistical provisions smooth total loan loss provisions over the
business cycle. This e¤ect can also be removed with a capital bu¤er system, but this
solution might imply large variations in banksequity. Our work therefore shows that
25If  = 0; we also note that '002 = '2 and '
00
4 = '4.
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the capital requirement is not the only institutional constraint which may amplify the
cyclicality of lending. Accounting rules on loan loss provisions are also a decisive factor
to explain the pro-cyclicality of banksbehavior. A strict backward-looking provisioning
system contributes to amplify the cyclicality of bank lending and a capital bu¤er cannot
easily remove this e¤ect. In Europe, the provisioning system is backward-looking (ex-
cluding Spain) but banks do not implement these accounting rules strictly. Consequently,
for practical purposes, European banks behave as if in a capital bu¤er system in which
banks can try to o¤set weaknesses of backward-looking provisioning rules. Clerc et al.
(2001) highlight that such a system leads to a procyclical evolution of the ratio of loan
loss provisions to total loans. It means that European banks do not succeed in o¤set-
ting weaknesses of backward-looking provisioning rules by covering expected losses with
equity or discretionary loan loss provisions.
The conclusions from this paper support the recent call of the Basel Committee for the
implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system to address procyclicality. More
precisely, the reform programme developed by the Basel Committee and referred as "Basel
III" stresses the importance of implementing a capital bu¤er system and a forward-looking
provisioning system as prudential measures to mitigate procyclicality in the banking
sector (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). But such a reform requires a
change of accounting standards towards an expected loss approach. In this regard, the
Committee is working closely with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
to reform the Fair Value Accounting system based on IAS 39. The objective is to reform
"the accounting model for provisioning to allow early identication and recognition of
losses by incorporating a broader ranger of available credit information than presently
included in the incurred loss model" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009).
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The implementation of a such model that allows earlier recognition of credit losses will
build up the level of provisions at an earlier point in time and will decrease the cyclicality
of lending; this could help nancial institutions to cope better with potential future crises.
References
Ahmed, A., Takeda, C., Thomas, S. (1999). "Bank loan loss provisions: a re-examination
of capital management, earnings management and signaling e¤ects". Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 28, 1-26.
Arpa, M., Giulini, I., Ittner, A., Pauer, F. (2001). "The inuence of macroeconomic
developments on Austrian banks: implications for banking supervision". BIS Papers, 1,
91-116.
Asea, P., Blomberg, B. (1998). "Lending cycles". Journal of Econometrics, 83, 89-128.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010. "The Basel Committees response to the
nancial crisis: Report to the G20". Bank of International Settelments.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009. "Guiding principles for the replacement
of IAS 39". Bank of International Settelments.
Berger, A., Udell, G. (2004). "The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality
of bank lending behavior". Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 458-495.
Bikker, J., Metzemakers, P. (2005). "Bank provisioning behavior and procyclicality".
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 15, 141-157.
Bikker, J. (2004). Cyclical patterns in prots, provisioning and lending of banks. In
Competition and e¢ ciency in a unied European banking market, 241-273.Edward Elgar.
Borio, C., Furne, C., Lowe, P. (2001). "Procyclicality of the nancial system and nan-
cial stability: issues and policy options". BIS Papers, 1, 1-57.
Bouvatier, V., Lepetit, L. (2010). "E¤ects of loan loss provisions on growth in bank
lending : some international comparisons". Mimeo.
Bouvatier, V., Lepetit, L. (2008). "Banks procyclicality behavior: does provisioning
matter ?", Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, 18, 513-
528.
Calza, A., Manrique, M., Sousa, J. (2006). "Credit in the euro area: An empirical in-
vestigation using aggregate data". The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46,
211-226.
Carletti, E., Hartmann, P., Spagnolo, G. (2007). "Bank mergers, competition and liquid-
ity". Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 1067-1105.
22
Cavallo, M., Majnoni, G. (2001). "Do banks provision for bad loans in good time? Em-
pirical evidence and policy implications". World Bank, Working Paper #2619.
Clerc, L., Drumetz, F., Jaudoin, O. (2001). "To what extent are prudential and accounting
arrangements pro- or countercyclical with respect to overall nancial conditions?" BIS
Papers, 1, 197-210.
Fernandez de Lis, S., Martinez Pagès, J., Saurina, J. (2001). "Credit growth, problem
loans and credit risk provisioning in Spain". BIS Papers, 1, 331-353
Furne, C. (2001). "Bank portfolio allocation: the impact of capital requirements, regu-
latory monitoring and economic conditions". Journal of Financial Services Research, 20,
33-56.
Guttentag, J., Herring, R. (1986). "Disaster myopia in international banking". Princeton
University, Essays in International Finance #164.
Henzel, S., Hülsewig, O., Mayer, E., Wollmershäuser, T. (2007). "The price puzzle re-
visited: can the cost channel explain a rise in ination after a monetary policy shock?"
CESifo, Working Paper #2039.
Jiménez, G., Saurina, J. (2006). "Credit cycles, credit risk, and prudential regulation".
International Journal of Central Banking, 2, 65-98.
Jokipii, T., Milne, A. (2006). "The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital bu¤ers".
Bank of Finland, Discussion Paper #17/2006.
Laeven, L., Majnoni, G. (2003). "Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too
Much, Too Late?" Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 178-197.
Lown, C., Morgan, D. (2006). "The credit cycle and the business cycle: new ndings using
the loan o¢ cer opinion survey". Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38, 1575-1598.
Mann, F., Michael, I. (2002). "Dynamic provisioning: issues and application". Bank of
England, Financial Stability Review, 12, 128-136.
Pain, D. (2003). "The provisioning experience of the major UK banks: A small panel
investigation". Bank of England, Working Paper.#177.
Perez, D., Salas-Fumas, V., Saurina, J. (2008). "Earnings and Capital Management in
Alternative Loan Loss Provision Regulatory Regimes". European Accounting Review, 17,
423-445.
Rajan, R. (1994). "Why bank credit policies uctuate: A theory and some evidence".
The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 109, 399-441.
Reinhart, C., Rogo¤, K. (2009). "This time is di¤erent, eight centuries of nancial folly".
Ed. Princeton University Press.
Van den Heuvel, S. (2002). "The bank capital channel of monetary policy". Unpublished
manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Walter, J. (1991). "Loan loss reserves". Federal Reserve Bank of Richemond, Economic
Review, July/August, 20-30.
23
Zicchino, L. (2006). "A model of bank capital, lending and the macroeconomy: Basel I
versus Basel II". Manchester School, Supplement 2006, 74, 50-77.
24
